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RATIONAL COERCION: CITIZENS UNITED AND A 
MODERN DAY PRISONER’S DILEMMA 
Anne Tucker* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper proposes neither a critique nor a review of the 2010 
Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission. Rather, this paper acknowledges that the Supreme Court 
has spoken on the issue of corporate First Amendment rights in the 
context of independent expenditures and asks the question: What 
happens next? While there are undoubtedly First Amendment and 
election law implications from the case, there are also important 
consequences for corporate law and for citizen shareholders.1 Instead 
of debating the merits of the case, this article asks if a corporation 
spends to influence political messages, what is the effect on 
shareholders? In answering that question, this article describes the 
“rational coercion”2 created in the prisoner’s dilemma and applies it 
to the issue of corporate political expenditures in an attempt to 
identify the effects of the Citizens United decision.  
                                                                                                                 
 * Anne Tucker is an Assistant Professor at Georgia State University College of Law in Atlanta, 
Georgia. Professor Tucker would like to express her gratitude to the participants of the Georgia State 
Law Review Symposium held on November 11, 2010, whose comments and presentations informed this 
article, as well as to the student editors who hosted a terrific event. Additionally, Eugene Volokh and 
Charles O’Kelley deserve to be recognized for their contributions in shaping the final version of this 
article. 
 1. This article uses the phrase “citizen shareholder” to discuss the questions of corporate political 
participation raised in Citizens United because the case implicates the participatory rights of citizens as 
well as their economic interests as shareholders. The phrase was first introduced by Jamie Raskin in a 
2003 book review of Voting with Dollars: A New Paradigm for Corporate Finance by Bruce Ackerman 
and Ian Ayers, and in Jamie Raskin, The Campaign-Finance Crucible: Is Laissez Fair?, 101 MICH. L. 
REV. 1532, 1549 (2003) (“What is at stake is not just the rights of ‘dissenting shareholders,’ for this 
phrase trivializes the structural transgression. Dissenting or not, citizen-shareholders in democratically 
chartered corporations have a right not to have their money put to the management's partisan political 
uses.”) (emphasis added). The comprehensive category of shareholders of publically traded companies 
in the United States certainly includes other groups such as non-citizen shareholders (i.e., those living 
and working here with a visa or a green card) as well as foreign nationals who neither live nor work in 
this country.  
 2. See infra Section III. 
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The prisoner’s dilemma demonstrates the pressure on corporations 
to participate in politics via their checkbooks. That pressure existed 
before Citizens United (i.e., political action committees and affiliated 
non-profit foundations, and charitable contributions), but was 
exacerbated with the expansion of corporate political speech through 
independent expenditures. Increased corporate political spending 
impacts both the participatory rights and the economic interests of 
citizen shareholders. The individually rational choice of corporations 
to make political expenditures creates irrational results, which will 
impact the price and efficiency of political messages as well as 
promote the inefficient allocation of corporate resources. An 
additional by-product of increased corporate political speech is the 
threat of shareholder-funded speech that is politically objectionable to 
some shareholders. Future debates of Citizens United must address 
these consequences of the decision. This article attempts to address 
both questions—the economic and the political—in part, by applying 
the prisoner’s dilemma to analyze the choice to be made by each 
corporation and the likely consequence. The intuitive outcome post- 
Citizens United is that more corporations will spend via independent 
expenditures. By utilizing the prisoner’s dilemma, this paper suggests 
a framework to understand why. 
As more corporations enter the political arena through 
expenditures, the actual cost of influence increases as does the overall 
costs of campaigns. Viewing the escalation of corporate political 
expenditures through the logical lens of simple game theory 
techniques like the classic prisoner’s dilemma suggests that the 
greater dedication of corporate resources to political communications 
will not improve the position of citizen shareholders,3 and may even 
harm shareholders by promoting an inefficient allocation of corporate 
resources. The conclusion is that the individually rational choice of 
corporations to make political expenditures leads to irrational results 
where our democratic structure may be harmed, where corporate 
resources are allocated to politics instead of production, and where 
shareholder wealth is comprised.  
                                                                                                                 
 3. See supra note 2.  
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A.  The Issue of Corporate Political Expenditures 
The Supreme Court, in Citizens United, overturned restrictions on 
corporate independent campaign expenditures that were codified in 
the Bi-Partisan Campaign Reform Act in 2002.4 After a rare re-
argument and revived facial challenge to 2 U.S.C. § 441b,5 the 
Court—in a 5–4 opinion—overturned § 441b’s restriction on 
corporate independent expenditures and overruled Austin v. Michigan 
Chamber of Commerce,6 a prior decision upholding such restrictions. 
In overturning the restrictions, the Court in Citizens United argued 
that independent expenditures—any expenditure made by 
corporations and labor unions but which are not coordinated7 with a 
                                                                                                                 
 4. 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(f)(3)(A)(i), 441(b)(2) (2006). “Section 441b makes it a felony for all 
corporations—including nonprofit advocacy corporations—either to expressly advocate the election or 
defeat of candidates or to broadcast electioneering communications within 30 days of a primary election 
and 60 days of a general election.” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 897 
(2010). 
 5. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 889–96; see also Adam Liptak, High Court Poised to Rewrite 
Spending Rules, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2009, at A12, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/30/us/politics/30movie.html. Justice Stevens’ dissent highlights that 
Citizens United expressly abandoned its facial challenge in its motion for summary judgment at the 
District Court. Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 931–32 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Plaintiff’s Memorandum 
Opposing FEC’s Summary Judgment Motion & Replying on Its Own Summary Judgment Motion, 
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 07-2240), 2008 WL 
2675855. 
 6. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). Citizens United also overruled 
parts of McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 257–58 (2003); Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 
913. 
 7. The Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) utilizes a three-prong test to determine whether an 
expenditure is coordinated by examining the payment source, the content of communication, and the 
conduct of the communication’s funder and creator. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, COORDINATED 
COMMUNICATIONS AND INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES BROCHURES, Feb. 2011, available at 
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/indexp.shtml#CC. Any communication paid for in whole or part by 
a party or individual other than the candidate or the campaign satisfies the payment prong. Id. To 
establish coordinated content, the FEC evaluates whether the communication is (1) express advocacy for 
the election or defeat of the candidate, (2) an electioneering communication, (3) contains campaign 
materials or images, or (4) clearly identifies a federal candidate and is distributed within the voting 
jurisdiction before a general election or primary. Id. Any one of the five following conditions satisfies 
the coordinated conduct prong: (1) the communication was made at the request or suggestion of the 
candidate or committee, (2) the candidate or committee were materially involved in the creation of the 
communication, (3) the communication was created after a substantial conversation with the candidate 
or the committee, (4) the communication was created by a vendor working with the candidate and that 
vendor shared information regarding the campaign’s needs or messages, or (5) the creator or funder of 
the communication was a former employee or independent contractor for the candidate or the 
committee. Id. An independent expenditure on the other hand is an uncoordinated communication that 
expressly advocates for the defeat or election of a federal candidate that is clearly identified. Id. (citing 
11 C.F.R. § 100.16(a) (2010)). 
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candidate or the candidate’s committee or party—do not raise 
corruption concerns, the only recognized compelling justification for 
restricting political speech under the current First Amendment 
jurisprudence.8 
Before the 2010 decision in Citizens United, individuals were 
limited to $2,000 direct candidate contributions and were allowed to 
make independent expenditures.9 Corporations, however, were 
prevented from making direct candidate contributions in any amount 
or from making any independent expenditures that expressly 
advocated for the support of or opposition to a candidate for federal 
office thirty days before a primary and sixty days before a general 
election.10 The contribution restrictions for both individuals and 
corporations were untouched by Citizens United, therefore the impact 
of the case rests upon the new, unlimited right of corporations to 
make independent political expenditures.11 Eliminating restrictions 
on corporate independent expenditures solidified certain First 
Amendment rights of corporations by disallowing distinctions 
between the political speech of individuals and that of corporations.12 
                                                                                                                 
 8. “[W]e now conclude that independent expenditures, including those made by corporations, do 
not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909. 
Reasoning that uncoordinated expenditures decrease the value of such speech to a candidate and the 
candidate’s campaign, the Court concluded that the uncoordinated nature therefore also decreases the 
potential for corruption or the appearance of corruption because there is less of a possibility of quid pro 
quo reciprocation. Id. at 908. “The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with 
the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also 
alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from 
the candidate.” Id. (emphasis in the original) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976)). 
 9. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1) (2006) (“[N]o person shall make contributions . . . to any candidate and his 
authorized political committees with respect to any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, 
exceed $2,000 . . . .”). 
 10. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2006), invalidated by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)). 
 11. Unions, subject to contribution and expenditure regulations similar to corporations, were also the 
subject of the Citizens United opinion. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886. This article, however, focuses 
exclusively on the impact of the decision on corporations. Additionally, qualifying non-profit 
corporations organized under 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(c)(3) and 527, as well as corporations qualifying for the 
MCFL (Massachusetts Citizens for Life) exceptions were exempted from the prohibitions on corporate 
campaign expenditures under § 441b and are therefore outside of the scope of the Citizens United 
holding and the issues addressed in this paper. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 
Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (establishing the MCFL exception). 
 12. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909, 913; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976) (noting 
that independent expenditures constitute expression “at the core of our electoral process and of the First 
Amendment freedoms”) (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)); Fed. Election Comm’n 
v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 493 (1985) (observing that independent 
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The Court struck down limitations on corporate independent political 
expenditures13 and abandoned prior justifications for the distinction 
based upon the “unique” threat of influence posed by corporate 
political speech.14 
The questions left after Citizens United are how will the new 
ability of corporations to make unlimited independent political 
expenditures affect political campaigns, citizens’ participatory rights, 
and shareholders’ return on investments. This paper utilizes the 
classic prisoner’s dilemma—a philosophical game about rational 
choice where two prisoners must independently decide whether to 
confess in exchange for a reduced sentence or remain silent in 
reliance upon the silence of the other prisoner—to analyze the 
                                                                                                                 
expenditures “produce speech at the core of the First Amendment”). It is important to note that many 
states did not ban or restrict independent expenditures in state elections prior to Citizens United. See, 
e.g., GA. ATTY GEN. OP. 95-26 (May 30, 1995), available at 
http://www.georgia.gov/00/opinion/detail/0,2668,87670814_90679019_108989073,00.html 
(determining that independent expenditures are not regulated by state campaign contribution limits 
described in O.C.G.A. § 21-5-41). Thus, the phenomenon described in this article (an projected increase 
in political spending by corporations) may have existed on the state level. The contrast between the 
scopes of national issues increases the incentive for companies to invest in shaping the message, public 
opinion, and voting as compared to the incentives to do the same on a state level. Cf., CA. FAIR 
POLITICAL PRACTICES COMM.’S, INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES: THE GIANT GORILLA IN CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE, May 2008, available at www.commoncause.org/atf/cf/%7Bfb3c17e2-cdd1-4df6-92be-
bd4429893665%7D/IEREPORT%20MAY%202008.pdf (reporting nearly $30 million spent in the form 
of independent expenditures in statewide elections in California in 2005-2006). 
 13. Under § 441(b), which was invalidated by Citizens United, corporations were prohibited from 
making independent expenditures which were defined as “using general treasury funds . . . [to] expressly 
advocate the election or defeat of a candidate, through any form of media, in connection with certain 
qualified federal elections.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887. Expenditures exclude “any news story, 
commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any broadcasting station, newspaper, 
magazine, or other periodical publication, unless such facilities are owned or controlled by any political 
party, political committee, or candidate.” 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (2006). The following types of 
corporate speech are excluded from the definition of an expenditure or contribution: (1) corporate 
communications to its stockholders and/or personnel on any subject, (2) corporate get-out-the-vote 
campaigns that are nonpartisan and aimed at stockholders and/or employees, and (3) the establishment 
of and solicitation of funds for a corporate-sponsored PAC. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.29 (2009). 
 14. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 941–43. Corporations, as legal persons created through state 
charter, have powers different from those of individuals, including perpetual life and the ability to amass 
great wealth in corporate treasuries. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 661 (1990), 
overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876; see also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why 
Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995, 1033 (1998) (arguing that corporations are also 
different from individuals in that they are “legally required to represent . . . a legally defined set of 
interests—the interests of a fictional creature called a shareholder that has no associations, economic 
incentives or political views other than a desire to profit from its connection with this particular 
corporation”). 
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corporate decision to make expenditures or not. In the prisoner’s 
dilemma the rational choice for each individual prisoner is to confess; 
however, the best result for both prisoners is for neither one to 
confess. The rational choice (confession) leads to an imperfect result, 
thus creating a situation that I have termed “rational coercion.”15 
Coercion, a concept that is typically disfavored in the law and 
sought to be mitigated,16 has been exacerbated by the Citizens United 
opinion.17 Coercion has several different iterations and meanings 
depending upon the context in which it is used.18 For those not 
steeped in corporate law, it is important to highlight that coercion has 
a specially recognized meaning within the field. In the corporate 
context, the phrase “coercion” is used to describe influences that 
promote a behavior that does not advance the best interests of the 
actor or which reflects interests held by those other than the actor. A 
recognized example of coercion in corporate law is the coercion19 
                                                                                                                 
 15. This article uses the phrase “rational coercion” to describe the phenomenon when the 
individually rational choice yields an imperfect result for the actor. See infra Section III. 
 16. See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987); Moran v. 
Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 
(Del. 1985) (addressing the structural coercion of two-tiered tender offers); see also Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 832 
(2006) (“Indeed, when structural coercion was the identified threat, proportionality review usually was 
perfunctory at best.”). In response to coercion concerns, the law has developed several protections 
against structurally coercive offers such as the Williams Act and the rules promulgated thereunder by 
the SEC. See Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78m(d)–(e), 78n(d)–(f) (2006) (reducing an acquirer’s ability to structure a coercive offer)); see also 
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14e-1, 240.14d-8, 240.14d-10 (2006) (establishing twenty day offer periods, pro-rata 
purchase requirements, and the “all-holders” rules that prevent discriminatory or coercive tender offers). 
 17. Prior to Citizens United, corporations had limited avenues of political participation, such as 
lobbying and political action committee (PAC) contributions; therefore, corporations were already under 
some pressure to participate. 
 18. See, e.g., Kathleen Kim, The Coercion of the Trafficked Workers, 96 IOWA L. REV. 409, 411 
(2011) (advancing a view of coercion in the criminal context that exculpates the acts of the coercee and 
places the legal responsibility on the coercer); Tamara L. Kuennen, Analyzing the Impact of Coercion on 
Domestic Violence Victims: How Much is Too Much?, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 2, 2 (2007) 
(discussing the role of coercion in domestic violence situations); Ekow N. Yankah, The Force of Law: 
The Role of Coercion in Legal Norms, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1195, 1197 (2008) (examining the role of 
coercion in legal theory). 
 19. Two of the three recognized threats to a corporation that justify the adoption of defensive 
measures by a board of directors are (1) “structural coercion (the risk that disparate treatment of non-
tendering holders might distort shareholders’ decisions on whether to tender),” and (2) “substantive 
coercion (the risk that shareholders will mistakenly accept an underpriced offer because they do not 
believe management’s representation of intrinsic value).” Meredith M. Brown et al., Contests for 
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present in hostile take-over situations such as with two-tiered tender 
offers.20 The coercion inherent in two-tiered tender offers where the 
fear of being in the “back end” of the offer encourages a shareholder 
to tender his or her shares regardless of whether the offered tender 
price is value maximizing or even adequate. Like with the prisoner’s 
dilemma, the rational, self-interested choice promotes a result that is 
not necessarily in the actor’s best interest. The rational coercion at 
play with two-tiered tender offers and prisoner’s dilemmas is similar 
to the pressure on a corporation to make a political expenditure,21 
even though it too may create an imperfect result. The landscape of 
corporate political speech post-Citizens United is that such speech 
may not be unduly restricted under the Constitution, but such speech, 
in the form of expenditures, now may be rationally coerced as a result 
of the choices left to corporations.  
B.  The Short Road Home  
This article analyzes the impact of Citizens United on corporate 
political participation and how the likely consequence of increased 
spending will in turn affect citizen shareholders. In Section II, this 
article introduces the concept of the citizen shareholders and their 
dual allegiances to democratic and economic interests. Section III 
presents the prisoner’s dilemma and explains how the individually 
rational choice of each actor leads to an imperfect result for all actors, 
thus establishing the concept of rational coercion. Section III also 
applies the reasoning derived from the classic prisoner’s dilemma to 
                                                                                                                 
Corporate Control 2009: Current Offensive & Defensive Strategies in M&A Transactions, 1717 
PLI/CORP 719, 738 (2009). 
 20. Wrongful coercion in corporate transactions, such as with two-tiered tender offers, has been 
described as occurring whenever “stockholders . . . vote in favor of the proposed transaction for some 
reason other than the merits of that transaction.” Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1382–83 (Del. 
1996); see also Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 YALE L.J. 
621, 631 (2003) (“The coercion problem is well-understood and well-accepted by practitioners and 
academic commentators on all sides of the defenses debate.”). For a discussion of other coercive 
techniques, such as those utilized to prevent holdouts in restructuring transactions, see Andrew Laurance 
Bab, Debt Tender Offer Techniques and the Problem of Coercion, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 850 (1991) 
(arguing that one coercive technique utilized to prevent holdouts is the threat of bankruptcy and 
liquidation value used to force bond holders to accept a conversion at a lower value). 
 21. See infra Section III. 
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the question of corporate political expenditures. Section III concludes 
that more corporations will make political expenditures after the 
decision in Citizens United, and increased participation will increase 
the overall costs of elections, but will not necessarily increase 
corporate influence over elections or legislative policy. This 
conclusion is further advanced in Section III with assertions that 
increased expenditures coupled with a potential for decreased 
efficacy raises concerns regarding corporate waste and the inefficient 
allocation of resources.  
II.  THE CONUNDRUM OF THE CITIZEN SHAREHOLDER 
The rights of corporations are intimately tied to the rights of 
individuals, as nearly half of all American adults are citizen 
shareholders.22 The impact of Citizens United on citizen shareholders 
is of significant concern, especially with the reality that 401K and 
employer-sponsored stock ownership plans are the predominant form 
of retirement savings in this country.23 For many, stock ownership is 
                                                                                                                 
 22. In 1989, when equity ownership in America was first calculated, 32% of American households 
owned stocks or bonds. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE & SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL 
MARKETS ASS’N, EQUITY AND BOND OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA, 2008, at 9 (2008), available at 
www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_08_equity_owners.pdf [hereinafter ICI & SIFMA]. As of the first quarter of 2008, 
47% of households in America (approximately 54.5 million citizens) own stocks or bonds, falling from a 
peak of 53% in 2001. Id.  
There are four primary means by which individuals may own stock. Thirty-four million 
directly own shares in publicly traded companies. Twenty-seven million own shares in 
equity mutual funds outside of retirement saving plans and pension accounts; some of 
these individuals also own stock directly. Nearly 34 million own equity through self-
directed retirement plans such as Individual Retirement Accounts, Keogh plans or 401(k) 
plans, and 48 million own equity through defined contribution pension plans. There is 
substantial overlap among these four methods of share ownership. When this overlap is 
accounted for, a total of 84 million shareowners hold stock through at least one of these 
channels, and three million hold stock through all four channels. 
J. WILLIAM HICKS, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. SECURITIES LAW § 2.30 (2011). Forty-three 
percent hold bond-based mutual funds and forty-five percent hold hybrid mutual funds. ICI & SIFMA, 
supra, at 32. 
 23. “Ownership inside tax-deferred accounts accounted for most of the increase in the 1989 to 2001 
period and has since remained steady, which implies that most of the decline since 2001 occurred 
outside tax-deferred account. Tax-deferred accounts include employer-sponsored retirement plans and 
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs).” ICI & SIFMA, supra note 23, at 15; see also Mark Klock, 
What Will It Take to Label Participation in a Deceptive Scheme to Defraud Buyers of Securities a 
Violation of Section 10(b)? The Disasterous Result and Reasoning of Stoneridge, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 
309, 352 (2010) (“At one time, a relatively small segment of the public invested in publicly-traded 
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practically compulsory as the only viable option for retirement 
savings. The breadth and, often, involuntariness of stock ownership 
highlights the importance of the dual questions of participatory rights 
and economic gain as they are irrevocably intertwined for a large 
segment of the American society. The overlap and potentially 
competing interests of the citizen shareholder elevate the import of 
Citizens United from a single-issue free speech case to one that 
dominates public discourse24 because the case highlighted the need to 
reexamine the question of how can our law best serve and preserve 
both participatory rights and economic interests of citizen 
shareholders; interests that are often at tension with one another.  
Indicating an intuitive understanding of the import of this case, the 
public’s response to Citizens United was automatic and visceral, with 
instant supporters and detractors, sparking debates about the role of 
democracy and the participatory rights of corporations, associations, 
and individuals.25 Unions were split in their response,26 while the 
                                                                                                                 
securities. Now a significant proportion of the U.S. population owns publicly-traded stocks, either 
directly or indirectly. A major trend in the investment world has been the remarkable growth of stock 
ownership through defined-contribution retirement plans. Additionally, there has been even more 
remarkable growth in mutual funds.” (footnote call numbers omitted)). 
 24. For a sampling of “pro” Citizens United reactions, see After Nearly 20 years, U.S. Supreme 
Court Finally Recognizes Corporate Free Speech Rights, Michigan Chamber of Commerce Reports, 
UNITED BUSINESS MEDIA PR NEWSIRE, Jan. 21, 2010, available at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/after-nearly-20-years-us-supreme-court-finally-recognizes-corporate-free-speech-rights-
michigan-chamber-of-commerce-reports-82301527.html; Bruce Kesler, Maggie’s Farm, Obama BS vs. 
Free Speech, Jan. 24, 2010, http://maggiesfarm.anotherdotcom.com/archives/13447-Obama-BS-Vs.-
Free-Speech.html; Howard Wasserman, PrawfsBlawg, Further Thoughts on Citizens United, Jan. 22, 
2010, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/01/further-thoughts-on-citizens-united.html. For 
a sample of “anti” Citizens United reactions, see David Kairys, Money Isn’t Speech and Corporations 
Aren’t People: The Misguided Theories Behind the Supreme Court’s Ruling on Campaign Finance 
Reform, SLATE, Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.slate.com/id/2242210; Brian J.M. Quinn, M&A Law Prof 
Blog, Corporate Free Speech, Jan. 22, 2010, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/2010/01/ 
corporate-free-speech.html; Manuel Garcia Jr., Corporate Personhood and Political Free Speech (Tin 
Man K.O.’s Straw Man), Jan. 22, 2010, http://dissidentvoice.org/2010/01/corporate-personhood-and-
political-free-speech-tin-man-k-o-s-straw-man. 
 25. Public opinion polls following the issuance of the Citizens United opinion demonstrated strong 
voter opposition to the decision: “This antipathy leaves voters staunchly opposed to anything that makes 
it easier for special interests to influence the outcome of elections, and by a two-to-one margin they 
oppose the recent Supreme Court decision on Citizens United.” STAN GREENBERG ET AL., STRONG 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM: GOOD POLICY, GOOD POLITICS 1 (Feb. 8, 2010), 
http://www.gqrr.com/articles/2425/5613_Campaign%20Finance%20Memo_Final.pdf; see also ABC 
News/Washington Post Poll, http://abcnews.go.com/images/PollingUnit/1102a6Trend.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 10, 2011). Compare these results to a response poll released by a conservative group, Campaign 
Freedom, http://www.campaignfreedom.org/docLib/20100304_CCPpoll03042010.pdf (last visited Mar. 
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ACLU maintained its unwavering support of Citizens United.27 
Murray Hill, a public relations company, announced its candidacy for 
Congress in the 2010 mid-term elections under the slogan, 
“Corporations are people too.”28 Election watchdog groups decried 
the prospect of a rising tidal wave of corporate money and influence 
into the election cycle29 that they claimed would pervert the process 
and drown out the voice of the individual.30 Academics predicted that 
                                                                                                                 
10, 2011), that claimed the first set of polls were biased and thereby focused this poll’s questions on 
whether the government should have power to “restrict speech.” A third poll, conducted by Gallup, 
showed that Americans believed that money is speech and that campaign spending should be restricted. 
“Fifty-seven percent of Americans consider campaign donations to be a protected form of free speech, 
and 55% say corporate and union donations should be treated the same way under the law as donations 
from individuals.” Lydia Saad, Public Agrees With Court: Campaign Money Is “Free Speech”, 
GALLUP, Jan. 22, 2010, http://www.gallup.com/poll/125333/public-agrees-court-campaign-money-free-
speech.aspx. For a sampling of the written response articles published in the wake of the Citizens United 
opinion, see Paul Sherman, Citizens United Decision Means More Free Speech, NATIONAL REVIEW, 
Jan. 21, 2010, http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/49332/citizens-united-decision-means-
more-free-speech/paul-sherman (supporting Citizens United); Steve Simpson, Citizens United and The 
Battle For Free Speech in America, THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD, Spring 2010, 
http://www.theobjectivestandard.com/issues/2010-spring/citizens-united.asp (supporting Citizens 
United). But cf. Joseph A. Palermo, “Citizens United” for More Corporate Power, THE HUFFINGTON 
POST, Jan. 24, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-apalermo/citizens-united-for-
more_b_434641.html (criticizing Citizens United). 
 26. The AFL-CIO and National Nurses United filed amicus briefs in support of Citizens United. 
Brief for AFL-CIO as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-205); see also Michael Whitney, Is Citizens United Decision Bad for 
Unions?, WORK IN PROGRESS, Jan. 25, 2010, http://workinprogress.firedoglake.com/2010/01/25/is-
citizens-united-decision-bad-for-unions; Lindsay Beyerstein, Will Citizens United Ruling Erode Labor’s 
Political Edge?, IN THESE TIMES, Jan. 28, 2010, http://www.inthesetimes.com/working/entry/ 
5481/will_citizens_united_ruling_erode_labors_political_edge. The SEIU (Service Employees 
International Union), which did not file an amicus brief in the case, issued a statement through 
Secretary-Treasurer Anna Burger arguing that “unleashing corporate spending will only serve to distort 
and ultimately delegitimize the electoral process.” Id. 
 27. The ACLU filed an amicus brief in support of Citizens United. Brief for ACLU as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Appellant, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08-
205), http://www.aclu.org/free-speech/citizens-united-v-federal-election-commission-aclu-amicus-brief; 
see also Stephen C. Webster, ACLU: Bill Aimed at Toppling Citizens United Decision Would 
“Compromise Free Speech”, RAW STORY, July 26, 2010, http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2010/07/26/aclu-
bill-aimed-toppling-citizens-united-decision-compromise-free-speech. 
 28. John Wagner, Campaign Stunt Launches a Corporate ‘Candidate’ for Congress, WASH. POST, 
Mar.13, 2010, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/12/ 
AR2010031204127.html; see also Murray Hill for Congress, http://murrayhillincforcongress.com. 
 29. Raymond J. La Raja, Will Citizens United v. FEC Give More Political Power to Corporations? 
8, 10 (Working Paper Series 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1642175; see also Justin 
Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 217 (2010). 
 30. Lisa Graves, Citizens United Is a Radical Rewriting of the Constitution by Pro-Corporate 
Supreme Court, CTR. FOR MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY, Jan. 21, 2010, http://www.prwatch.org/ 
CitizensUnitedWronglyDecided. 
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elections and electability would become increasingly focused on fund 
raising, reducing the time and attention that elected officials could 
devote to legislating.31 
Essentially, the collective fears following Citizens United can be 
distilled into the following categories: (1) increased cost of elections 
generally, (2) unfair advantage to one political party,32 (3) dominance 
of corporate interests as a decisive factor in voter decisions because 
of the amount of speech that these entities can generate,33 and (4) 
pursuit of pro-business policies even at the expense of the rights and 
welfare of individuals.34 The criticisms largely ignore the unique 
perspective of the citizen shareholder who has interests in preserving 
the democratic integrity of both our election cycles and our elected 
officials as well as in maximizing the return, or potential for return, 
on her investment in corporations. If corporations are spending 
money in the political arena, the corporate law question that must be 
asked is how the expanded participatory rights of corporations affect 
the owners of the corporations, the citizen shareholders.35 Divorcing 
the economic questions from the participatory questions raised by 
Citizens United ignores the overlapping interests of citizen 
shareholders and therefore a large portion of the context and 
consequences of this decision. This article attempts to address both 
questions, in part, by applying the prisoner’s dilemma to analyze both 
                                                                                                                 
 31. Levitt, supra note 30, at 233. 
 32. La Raja, supra note 30, at 3. 
 33. Levitt, supra note 30, at 224–25. 
 34. If volume of speech is a proxy for breadth of support, then the increase in corporate speech 
funded by increased treasuries of corporations becomes a perverting influence in democratic 
participation. See La Raja, supra note 30, at 3 (“[If] [t]he breadth of support for a given proposition . . . 
[is a heuristic] . . . for majoritarian merit . . . [that] factor[s] into voters’ election choices . . . [and] if 
voters employ a heuristic equating quantity of speech with breadth of support, [then] great volumes of 
corporate speech might cause voters rationally seeking a bandwagon to follow a bandwagon that does 
not exist.”); Levitt, supra note 30, at 225–26. 
 35. See Nicholas Wolfson, The First Amendment and the SEC, 20 CONN. L. REV. 265, 288 (1988). 
Shareholder wealth maximization as a principle of corporate law is a mechanism to align the interests of 
corporate managers (directors and officers) with the interests of the shareholder owners. See, e.g., 
Hector Rocha, People, Firms and Society: Three Proposals for Aligning Personal Motives, Firm’s 
Goals and Societal Needs (June 30–July 2, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1295193. Cf. M. 
Todd Henderson, Everything Old is New Again: Lessons from Dodge v. Ford Motor Company (The 
Chicago Working Paper Series Index, Working Paper No. 373, Dec. 2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1070284 (arguing that the shareholder wealth maximization rationale of Dodge 
v. Ford is overemphasized and mistaught). 
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the choice to be made by each corporation and the likely 
consequences. 
III.  RATIONAL CHOICES AND IRRATIONAL RESULTS CREATE 
RATIONAL COERCION 
The expanded right of corporations to make political expenditures 
raises certain questions such as whether this will (a) increase the cost 
of elections, (b) influence policy decisions, and (c) benefit 
corporations and their shareholders from an economic perspective. 
Before these consequences can be dissected, the basic question facing 
corporations must first be addressed: to spend or not to spend? 
Whether or not to make independent political expenditures36 is a 
choice that each corporation must make, and that choice can be 
analyzed utilizing the classic prisoner’s dilemma to determine the 
rational outcome and the likely consequences of such actions. 
A.  The Classic Prisoner’s Dilemma 
To predict an outcome in the expenditure dilemma facing each 
corporation we turn to a classic philosophy puzzle, the prisoner’s 
dilemma, used to forecast and discuss rational behavior. There are 
many variations on the prisoner’s dilemma, a popular game theory 
tool used to assess risk aversion and decision making with imperfect 
information and a selfish motivation.37 Regardless of the variation of 
the game, the basic elements38 are similar. Two suspects are taken 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Citizens United did not alter corporations’ right to participate in political speech through existing 
avenues such as (1) contributions to political action committees (PACs), (2) expenditures on direct 
lobbying efforts, and (3) utilizing corporate funds to encourage employees to support or oppose a 
particular candidate or issue. See KENT R. MIDDLETON & WILLIAM E. LEE, THE LAW OF PUBLIC 
COMMUNICATION 302 (7th ed. 2011) (“Profit-making corporations . . . may support PACs and engage in 
partisan communication—including advocating the election of specific candidates—provided the 
communications are directed only to the corporate . . . ‘family.’ A corporation may use corporate funds 
to urge management, shareholders, and their families to vote for a specific candidate . . . .”).   
 37. See generally WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA (1992) (discussing the historical 
developments and developers of the prisoner’s dilemma); see also PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY AND 
COOPERATION, PRISONER’S DILEMMA AND NEWCOMB’S PROBLEM (Raymond Campbell & Lanning 
Sowden eds. 1985) (discussing the historical developments and developers of the prisoner’s dilemma). 
 38. See, e.g., POUNDSTONE, supra note 37 at 117; see also Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prisoner-dilemma. 
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into custody and neither is able to speak to the other. The police 
admit that they have insufficient evidence to convict the suspects on 
the principal charges without a confession of one or more parties. 
Each prisoner is then presented the option to confess or stay silent. If 
prisoner A confesses but prisoner B does not, then A faces the 
minimum sentence (or depending upon the scenario no jail time at 
all), but if prisoner B confesses and A does not, A faces the maximum 
sentence on the principal charge. The other choice, not explicitly 
presented by the police, is that if neither confesses they will both 
walk on the principal charge and face fines or minimum sentences on 
the lesser charge. Additionally, if both confess then they will both 
receive a reduced, but not the minimum, sentence on the principal 
charge. Both Prisoner A and B are presumed to be entirely self-
motivated in that each is only concerned with minimizing his or her 
own prison sentence.39 The choices and consequences of the 
prisoners are charted below. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Hazel Rose Marcus & Shinobu Kitayama, Culture and the Self--Implications for Cognition, 
Emotion, and Motivation, 98 PSYCH. REV. 224 (1991) (arguing that the “western” view of the self as an 
independent individual who should act in its own interest and in expression of one’s uniqueness differs 
from other cultural views of self, such as the “eastern” view of interdependence which shapes behavior 
in reference to the common good), available at http://faculty.washington.edu/mdj3/MGMT580/ 
Readings/Week%205/Markus.pdf. 
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Table 1. Classic Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
 
B Is Silent B Confesses 
A Is Silent 
 
A 0 years on principal 
charge 
 
B 0 years on principal 
charge 
A max. sentence on 
principal charge 
 
B minimum sentence 
on principal charge 
A Confesses 
A minimum sentence 
on principal charge 
 
B max. sentence 
A reduced sentence on 
principal charge 
 
B reduced sentence on 
principal charge 
 
In the classic prisoner’s dilemma scenario, there is always an 
incentive to confess because it always reduces the maximum sentence 
that either prisoner could face. Without information as to what the 
other party is doing, the risk averse or rational person more likely 
than not chooses to confess and takes the known but limited 
punishment.40 Confession is always a better solution for the 
individual actor over silence when the other party’s position is 
unknown and thus it is the strictly dominant solution.41 Players are 
presumed not only to play the dominant strategy, but to predict that 
                                                                                                                 
 40. A. Parkhe, E.C. Rosenthal & R. Chandran, Prisoner’s Dilemma Payoff Structure in Interfirm 
Strategic Alliances: An Empirical Test, 21 OMEGA INT. J. OF MGMT SCI. 531, 532 (1993); John H. 
Miller, The Coevolution of Automata in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, 29 J. OF ECON. BEHAVIOR & 
ORG. 87, 90 (1996); see also supra note 38; DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW, 
10 (Harvard University Press 1994) (“If a player knows the strategies available to it and the other 
players but what they do not know is what strategy the other player actually chooses . . . this is a game 
of complete but imperfect information. If a player were unaware of something other than the strategy 
choice of another player, such as the payoffs the other player receives it would be a game of incomplete 
information. If a player knows everything and can observe what the other player chooses, then it is a 
game with complete and perfect information.”). 
 41. If there is a choice for an actor that is better for the motorist no matter what the other player 
chooses it is a strictly dominant strategy. “A dominant strategy is a best choice for a player for every 
possible choice by the other player. One strategy is ‘dominated by’ another strategy when it is never 
better than that strategy and is sometimes worse. When one strategy is always worse than other, it is 
‘strictly dominated.’” Id. at 11. It is assumed that players choose the strictly dominant solution. Id. 
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the other player will also choose a dominant strategy.42 The rational 
decision to confess, therefore, is the same decision that the other 
prisoner should make, thus leaving both prisoners facing a reduced, 
but substantial, sentence on the principal charge. The interesting 
observation from the prisoner’s dilemma is that it illustrates the 
inherent conflict between individual and group rationality.43 Rational 
self-interest (confess) in this game scenario leads to a result that 
leaves all members of the group worse off than if they had pursued 
the interest of the group (coordinated silence).44 The pursuit of 
rational self-interest is coercive: in order to protect their individual 
position, the actors are forced to make choices that do not produce 
the best outcome for the individual while simultaneously weakening 
the position of the group. 
B.  A Modern Day Prisoner’s Dilemma: Corporate Political 
Expenditures 
Parallels can be drawn between the classic prisoner’s dilemma and 
a corporation’s decision to make political expenditures.45 Borrowing 
from the outcome in the prisoner’s dilemma, one can make 
assumptions about how self-interested, rational (and risk averse)46 
corporations will act in the face of limited information47 about the 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Id.  
 43. “Thus, PD is a game where individually rational actions produce a collectively suboptimal 
outcome, called a social trap . . . .” Parkhe et al., supra note 40, at 532–33. 
 44. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, supra note 38. 
 45. Expenditures create a unique scenario for analyzing corporate political activity. Direct 
contributions are both capped (a known risk) and disclosed (complete information) that eliminates 
essential elements of unknown risk and imperfect information inherent in the classic prisoner’s dilemma 
scenario. Independent expenditures are subject to some reporting requirements, but often after the point 
where it could spur a counteractive response and the there is no ceiling for the amount of the 
expenditures thus creating incomplete information. See infra note 48. 
 46. “[R]isk aversion entails that the utility of participation in the given rent-seeking contest is lower 
than the utility of the expected value of taking part in the rent-seeking contest. Risk attraction would 
correspond to the opposite opinion, while indifference is called risk neutrality.” Tina Søreide, Too Risk 
Averse to Stay Honest? Business Corruption, Uncertainty and Attitudes Toward Risk, 29 INT’L REV. OF 
L. & ECON. 388, 391 (Dec. 2009); see also POUNDSTONE, supra note 37, at 44 (“Game theory is about 
perfectly logical players interested only in winning.”). 
 47. It should be noted that once a campaign is launched by one industry group or corporation and the 
information as to the existence of the campaign is known, the question then would be how will opposing 
corporations/industry groups respond. The lack of information addressed above is largely confined to the 
questions of the initial decision to engage in a campaign, and within existing debates it is not whether 
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level of expenditures made by competitors or opposing industries.48 
Without knowing what competitors or industry opponents are doing, 
the risk averse choice is to make expenditures that are believed to 
expose a corporation to the least amount of risk and also serve the 
interest of the corporation.49 A rational choice by the corporation 
                                                                                                                 
there will be spending, but how much and in what form. Additionally, independent expenditures are not 
exempt from FEC reporting requirements. For example, a Political Action Committee or political 
committee must disclose independent expenditures in excess of $200 in an annual report. Individuals 
contributing more than $250 to independent expenditures must also file an annual report. Support of 
independent expenditures in excess of $10,000 must be reported in a 48-hour report filed with the FEC. 
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, supra note 8 (independent expenditure reports filed with the FEC can 
be searched utilizing this FEC database: http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/ie_reports.shtml). 
 48. “It does not take much to create a prisoner’s dilemma. The main ingredient is a temptation to 
better one’s own interests in a way that would be ruinous if everyone did it.” POUNDSTONE, supra note 
37, at 125–29. The same analogy can be applied to questions of corporate advertising, especially with 
regard to comparative advertising where Company A is pushing its version of product X over Company 
B’s version of product X, and Company B is engaged in the opposite message campaign. The questions 
raised in this article, such as (a) does the rational self-interest promote increased corporate spending, and 
(b) does such spending benefit shareholders, are the same in the context of corporate advertising. The 
answer to question (a) for advertising is, generally, yes, at least in the short term. The analysis, however, 
changes with regard to question (b) where the spending is intended to grow or maintain market share for 
a particular company. Corporate spending on advertising can be distinguished from resources allocated 
to political messages because (i) messages to influence voting behavior at the consumer/citizen level is a 
zero sum game with only votes to be cast for each election, whereas consumer product consumption is 
not necessarily a zero sum game (i.e., the ability to expand the market to new audiences or generally 
increase consumption); (ii) advertising dollars have a more direct correlation to the intended outcome 
than do political messages; (iii) advertising dollars and the effect of advertising are measurable 
outcomes and therefore are more likely to be monitored by and weighed-in on post hoc by (institutional) 
shareholders; (iv) the intended result of advertising dollars (grow or maintain market shares) relates 
directly to shareholder return and the value of the firm; and (v) companies advertising their products are 
in the best position to educate consumers regarding such products, which may not be the case for 
company-sponsored political messages. There are counter-arguments to this last point, specifically with 
regard to industry-specific campaigns related to questions directly affecting the industry such as energy. 
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 907 (2010) (“The purpose and effect 
of this law [ban on independent expenditures] is to prevent corporations, including small and nonprofit 
corporations, from presenting both facts and opinions to the public.”). 
 49. Pursuant to Dodge v. Ford, corporations owe their shareholders a singular fidelity to maximizing 
shareholder wealth in the form of corporate returns. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 682 
(Mich. 1919); see also Wolfson, supra note 35, at 288. The issue of information could be addressed 
through increased disclosure requirements of corporations, such as those proposed in the Shareholder 
Protection Act of 2010, H.R. 4790, 111th Congress (2010), available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-4790. Complete information, however, would not 
remove the basic incentive to make expenditure. For example, if Corporation A knows that Corporation 
B will not be making expenditure, there is greater incentive for Corporation A to make the expenditure 
and thus gain an advantage over B. Additionally, if Corporation A knows that Corporation B is making 
expenditure, then there is an incentive for Corporation A, assuming it is an opponent or adversely 
interested to B, to make an expenditure and not lose ground to Corporation B. Additionally, the 
assumptions regarding information addressed in this paragraph and the those regarding self-interest 
addressed in the following paragraph do not take into account the complex and often inter-related 
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should in theory benefit the corporation, but at a minimum, those 
actions should not put a company in a worse position relative to 
competitors or opposing industry members.  
In order to apply the question of corporate political expenditures to 
the prisoner’s dilemma, the same constraints that exist in the classic 
dilemma must be present, or at least assumed. Therefore, in this 
analysis, one must suppose that corporations will act only in self-
interest,50 which seems perhaps an easier assumption than the one 
that people will always act only in their self-interest.51 The 
corporations are also assumed to have imperfect information about 
what the other corporation is doing, just like there is imperfect 
information in the prisoner’s dilemma.52 Corporations are also 
presumed to choose a dominant strategy, when available, over a 
dominated strategy.53 
Additionally, one must assume that the potential reward sought by 
and consequences to be avoided by corporations are roughly equal. 
                                                                                                                 
organization of large corporations that utilize a web of affiliates and subsidiaries to supplement, 
augment, or diversify the holdings, production, or distribution of the parent company. See Philip L, 
Blumberg et al., 1 BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS § 1.03 (Supp. 2009) (stating that in 2002, the 
100 largest American corporations had an average of 187 subsidiaries, of which an average of 179 were 
95% or more owned by the parent corporation). In these cases the assumptions about incomplete 
information self-interest may not be true where there is overlap between officers, members of the board 
of directors, and missions between the companies. 
 50. The self-interest in the classic dilemma means that neither prisoner cares about decreasing the 
sentence of the other prisoner, only about decreasing or eliminating his or her own sentence. With 
corporations as our substitute actors, the self-interest requires a fidelity to shareholder wealth 
maximization through things such as protected market share, favorable regulatory environment, 
decreased taxes, etc. Additionally, we must assume that Corporations A and B have opposite, or at least 
inconsistent, positions for the game to work. If Corporations A and B were both advancing the same 
message, the outcome of the game, as indicated by the rewards, punishments, etc., would be 
significantly altered.  
 51. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 682; see also Greenwood, supra note 15, at 1009. 
 52. The structure of the police interrogation ensures that the hypothetical prisoners have imperfect 
information: neither prisoner knows what the other has or will decide with regard to the confession. 
While there is no structural element preventing corporations from providing information about future 
political expenditures, that information is not routinely made public as a part of either SEC filings or 
annual reports—both of which report historical spending, not projected spending—at least with regard to 
expenditures and other forms of political speech. Information sharing that would inform the decision 
would have to occur before the expenditure is made (or at least at a time that still allows for a counter 
expenditures to be made) in order to influence the outcome in the prisoner’s dilemma. Because this 
analysis assumes that Corporations A and B are opposing actors, there is little incentive for either side to 
disclose its intentions to the other.  
 53. “A player will choose a strictly dominant strategy whenever possible and will not choose any 
strategy that is strictly dominated.” See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 40, at 11.  
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The resources of the acting corporations must be assumed to also be 
relatively equal so that the decision to make expenditures requires the 
same level of resource prioritization and risk ratio within each firm. 
Resource prioritization reflects the finite number of resources within 
a firm so that a decision to pursue option A either eliminates or 
reduces the ability to pursue option B.54 Risk ratio reflects the 
percentage of firm resources that are being dedicated to a given 
policy with the goal of achieving a certain objective. If Company A 
has $100 million in assets and Company B has $1 million in assets, a 
$500,000 expenditure by both companies to influence clean coal 
technology represents a 50% risk ratio for Company B and a 0.5% 
risk ratio for Company A. The greater the risk ratio for a company, 
the more that is at stake in the outcome of the prisoner’s dilemma. 
Assuming that these elements are equal is necessary so that the 
corporations are facing equal risks and consequences just like the 
equal risks and consequences faced by the hypothetical prisoners in 
the original game. The reward sought by the hypothetical companies 
in our modern day prisoner’s dilemma is more complex and nuanced 
than the reduced or no sentence reward sought in the prisoner’s 
dilemma. However, we can assume that there is a reward being 
sought by corporate political spending whether it is gaining 
advantage over a competitor or opposing industry, shaping favorable 
policy, exerting influence over politics, or molding a compatible 
regulatory environment. Regardless of the exact reward sought by 
each corporation, we must also assume that the rewards are of 
comparable value to each company so that the risk/reward ratio are 
roughly the same for the two companies locked in the prisoner’s 
dilemma. 
Finally, one must assume that the acting corporations are the only 
ones spending on any given issue or candidate so as to avoid the 
                                                                                                                 
 54. See BARRY H. POTTER & JACK DIAMOND, GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 
MANAGEMENT 1–4 (2000). I originally coined this the “risk/reward ratio” attempting to reflect the 
resources at stake in independent expenditures to achieve a certain result, however “risk ratio” is the 
better comparative term because each company’s hoped-for-gain will be different making both 
quantification and comparison difficult of the actual reward difficult. For simplicity in analysis, I leave 
in only the phrase “risk ratio” to compare the allocation and therefore implicit prioritization of the 
company resources invested in independent expenditures. 
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complicating problem of combining support or opposition for a 
candidate or an issue among several like-interested entities or 
association.55 If Corporations A and B were making expenditures to 
advance a similar message, the reward, punishment, temptation, and 
deception outcomes would be significantly altered.56  
These assumptions are obvious limitations to the analysis. They do 
not, however, remove the question of corporate political expenditures 
from the rational coercion demonstrated in the classic prisoner’s 
dilemma.57 A corporation’s decision to make political expenditures 
presents the same options (and consequences) as does the choice 
between confessing and silence in the traditional prisoner’s dilemma. 
If Corporation A makes political expenditures, it presents the 
opportunity to gain the most if the opponent is silent or, to minimize 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, supra note 38 (“Unlike the more straightforward 
generalization, this matrix does reflect common social choices—between depleting and conserving a 
scarce resource, between using polluting and non-polluting means of manufacture or disposal, and 
between participating and not participating in a group effort towards some common goal.”). For 
example, consider ten companies that invest in and produce biodiesel decide to pool their resources 
together to create issue advertisements for more stringent emissions standards and requirements of 
higher gas mileage in an effort to boost popularity and sales of alternative fuel vehicles. The 
collaborative nature of the expenditure removes the decision from the classic prisoner’s dilemma matrix. 
The pooled resources may also substantially alter the assumptions about equal resources and equal 
benefit/consequences that are necessary for the rational coercion to produce the consistent result of 
encouraging corporate spending on political expenditures. See, e.g., POUNDSTONE, supra note 37, at 
125–28 (describing the problem of free-riders, which occurs when there is a classic prisoner’s dilemma 
but with more than one player). The limitation of the prisoner’s dilemma in the context of corporate 
political spending is not unique to this new application. In an earlier critique of the prisoner’s dilemma 
game theory, one author wrote: 
[It] is implausible in the extreme for any real-life analogues of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma. . . . 
 . . . [However] [d]espite the implausibility . . . there is some point to considering its 
implications in Prisoner’s Dilemma and other contexts. It is needed for speculations a la 
Hobbes or Rawls as to what ideally rational agents would do in a “state of nature” or 
other “original position.” . . . But mere knowledge of the theoretical result should . . . be 
beneficial . . . . 
Lawrence H. Davis, Prisoners Paradox, and Rationality, 14 AM. PHIL. Q. 319, 326–27 (1977). 
 56. While there will surely be coordination of spending through vehicles such as political action 
committees, there is value in understanding the fundamental rational choices presented in this simple 
equation of Corporation A opposing Corporation B, the results of which can be extrapolated to more 
complicated scenarios. 
 57. Michael A. Rabkin, Tactical Interdependence and Institutionalized Trust: The Unrecognized 
Risks of Joint Ventures Among Competitors, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 63, 78–79 (2008) (applying 
the prisoner’s dilemma to analyze the risks of joint ventures between multinational corporations); Robert 
Allen, Comment, Securities Litigation as a Coordination Problem, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 475, 487 (2009) 
(applying the prisoner’s dilemma to shareholder derivative suits). 
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risk exposure, if Corporation B also makes a comparable expenditure. 
In both scenarios, the choice to make the expenditure is the rational 
choice for Corporation A because, like confession for the prisoner, 
expenditures always provide some benefit to Corporation A. Thus, 
there is rational coercion to make expenditures, the dominant 
strategy. Like with the classic prisoner’s dilemma scenario, 
Corporation B will reach the same conclusion as does Corporation A, 
and both will predict that the other corporation choose the dominant 
strategy (make an expenditure), thus promoting the conclusion that 
both corporations will make expenditures. In the context of corporate 
expenditures, when both actors choose to spend, the intended result 
(influence) is diminished by the counteracting expenditure from the 
other corporation so that neither achieves the maximum benefit when 
both participate. 
While expenditures always produce a positive result for 
Corporation A (some gain achieved or harm avoided), the decision to 
remain silent only benefits Corporation A if B also remains silent. Of 
course, if both corporations choose silence, it produces an efficient 
result because there is no relative advantage or harm to either 
company (similar to the outcome if both companies make 
expenditures) and the resources that would otherwise be spent on the 
expenditure are retained by the firm (a different result than if both 
companies make expenditures). Silence from Corporation A, 
however, will always benefit Corporation B because either B will get 
the undiluted effect of its expenditure or no company contributes and 
neither company is worse off. Conversely, if Corporation A is silent, 
but Corporation B, a competitor or corporation in an opposing 
industry (e.g., an oil company versus an electric car manufacturer),58 
makes significant expenditures, then A is potentially harmed by 
remaining silent. The rational conclusion for Corporation A is that, 
                                                                                                                 
 58. This prisoner’s dilemma only works between entities with opposing positions: for example, a 
tobacco company (as Corporation A) versus a smoking cessation aid company (as Corporation B) or a 
fuel company (as Corporation A) versus a green energy biotech (as Corporation B). The analogy breaks 
down when applied to competitors in the same industry that could foreseeably benefit from the 
contributions of others (i.e., for issue support), although would be excluded from “pork” barrel support 
(i.e., a specific tax break, new road to the factory, exemption, etc.). 
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between silence and expenditures, making an expenditure is the 
rational choice (even though coercive) because silence poses the 
greatest risk.  
Like with the classic prisoner’s dilemma scenario, everyone may 
benefit if no one confesses, or in this case, makes expenditures. 
Without the ability to guarantee adherence to the individually 
irrational choice (silence), then each corporation is coerced into 
taking the action with a known, protective benefit, but which may not 
produce the most efficient result (i.e., everyone staying silent, or 
everyone not making expenditures). The inability to ensure 
abstinence from expenditures keeps it from being the rational choice 
for either Corporation A or B and promotes the decision to make an 
expenditure.  
 
Table 2. Classic Prisoner’s Dilemma  
Applied to Corporate Political Expenditures 
 
 B Is Silent B Makes Expenditures 
 
 
 
A Is Silent  
A no gain or loss 
relative to B & value 
retained 
 
B no gain or loss 
relative to A & value 
retained 
 
A is disadvantaged 
relative to B 
 
 
B benefits from rent 
seeking behavior & 
undiluted message 
 
 
A Makes 
Expenditures  
A benefits from rent 
seeking behavior & 
undiluted message 
 
B is disadvantaged 
relative to A. 
A no gain or loss relative 
to B & value lost 
  
 
B no gain or loss relative 
to A & value lost 
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The consequences of choosing to or refraining from engaging in 
corporate political expenditures differ in several respects from the 
consequences in the traditional prisoner’s dilemma. However, the 
ultimate outcome should remain the same. First, in the classic 
prisoner’s dilemma example, what is at stake is imprisonment, which 
is a consequence whose severity is not dependent upon whether it is 
shared or not by the other actor. Both actors can, in theory, serve the 
maximum sentence or walk away completely. With corporate 
political expenditures what is being sought by the actors is not the 
lowest jail sentence, but the greatest relative advantage over the other 
actor. An advantage sought by the corporate actors can only be 
gained by harming the position of the other corporate actor, thus 
making the corporate political expenditure scenario a zero sum 
game.59  
Additionally, with the question of expenditures there is a resource 
that must be either expended or retained by the firm and it creates a 
secondary consequence. For example, in the situation where both 
Corporation A and B abstain from expenditures and where they both 
engage in expenditures, neither company is harmed nor able to gain a 
relative advantage over the other, but because the cash resources are 
retained in the scenario where both actors abstain, it is a more 
efficient result than when both actors engage. The outcome under the 
matrix is still the same, though, because the resulting reward that 
occurs if both corporations cooperate (remain silent) outweighs the 
results if both corporations defect (make expenditures) in terms of 
resources retained by the corporation. 
The rational coercion at play with expenditures can best be 
understood as a series of rewards (R), punishments (P), temptations 
(T), and deceptions (D). The reward (no harm and no lost resources) 
occurs when both actors remain silent; the punishment (no advantage 
but lost resources) occurs when both make expenditures; and the 
temptation (advantage gained as sole expender) and the resulting 
                                                                                                                 
 59. JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 
46–47 (Princeton Univ. Press 1953) (1944). A zero sum situation means that as one actor gains another 
actor loses. If all advantages and all disadvantages were added up then the result sum is zero. Id. 
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deception (disadvantage of silence) occur when only one corporation 
makes expenditures.  
 
Table 3. Corporate Expenditure Dilemma and the Payoff Analysis 
 
 B Is Silent B Makes Expenditures 
A Is Silent 
 
A = R 
 
B = R 
A = D 
 
B = T 
A Makes 
Expenditures 
A = T 
 
B = D 
A = P 
 
B = P 
 
From either corporation’s perspective T > R > P > D; therefore, the 
rational choice for either corporation is to make expenditures. Similar 
to the classic model, the end result if both corporations remain silent 
is the production of (R), which is a better outcome than if both 
corporations participate (P). The individually rational choice 
produces an imperfect result, thus demonstrating that Citizens United 
has established an environment that exacerbates the pressure on 
corporations to participate politically through independent 
expenditures.  
C.  Consequences of Rational Coercion in Corporate Political 
Expenditures 
Borrowing from the reasoning in the classic prisoner’s dilemma, 
one can analyze the strong incentive that corporations will have to 
make expenditures when they are acting independently, with 
incomplete knowledge, and in their own self-interest. Under the 
classic prisoner’s dilemma matrix, which includes the threat of being 
disadvantaged by silence and the controlled (i.e., known) risks 
associated with spending, one can hypothesize that some corporate 
political expenditures may be made as a result of the coercion 
exacerbated by Citizens United rather than as an independent, 
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business decision that would have been reached before Citizens 
United.  
1.  Increased Costs of Participation and Decreased Effectiveness 
As more corporations reach the rationally coercive decision to 
make expenditures, it raises the costs of elections. Not only will other 
special interest groups be motivated to engage (spend), so too will 
candidates who want to control campaign messages and frame the 
debate regarding hot topic issues. As the total pool of money 
increases, it creates additional pressure on elected officials to raise 
comparable sums to contain, frame, and combat third party messages 
that may impact the campaign. Increased participation therefore 
ratchets up the cost of influence as between businesses as well as for 
all political participants. 
Additionally, if more corporations are rationally coerced into 
making expenditures, the potential utility of that expenditure is likely 
to decrease. With increased participation there is a greater likelihood 
that the message disseminated through the expenditure will be 
counterbalanced by a competing message or drowned out in the 
increasing political noise generated by the other corporations. When 
Corporations A and B both make expenditures, the result is the 
stalemate solution “P” where there is no relative advantage gained or 
lost and where the corporate resources have been expended by the 
firm.60 This analysis looks at the risks and rewards of silence or 
expenditures as between two competitive or opposing industry 
corporations. The value of expenditures is modified when analyzed as 
between corporations and individuals. For example, if a group of 
corporations advocated for pro-business policies such as a favorable 
regulatory environment or decreased taxes, the increased 
expenditures on this particular message would not be canceled out or 
mitigated by collective, coordinated increased participation. 
                                                                                                                 
 60. The article examines the effect of increased spending on corporate returns. The presence of 
coordinated action and the absence of equally matched opponents erode the conclusions of the prisoner’s 
dilemma that increased spending will create a P for participating companies. This scenario is outside of 
the assumptions relied upon herein.  
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Additionally, increased participation would yield better results for 
each individual corporation and could be an effective tool of 
influencing elections or the resulting policy. 
Applying the classic prisoner’s dilemma to the corporate political 
expenditures authorized in Citizens United, there is reason to 
conclude that the concern regarding the increased cost of elections is 
valid. In the 2010 midterm election, for example, the increase in 
outside spending (i.e., independent expenditures) dramatically 
outpaced overall spending increases in the election cycle. The total 
cost of the 2010 midterm election was over $4 billion, which 
represents a 71.25% increase over the $2.85 billion price tag of the 
2006 midterm election.61 Outside spending, in comparison, increased 
565% in the 2010 election with $210 million spent compared to $37 
million in 2006.62 The theory and the evidence both support the 
conclusion that eliminating restrictions on corporate political 
expenditures will increase the overall cost of elections. The prisoner’s 
dilemma also demonstrates that, while corporate political spending 
will increase, benefits from such increases are likely to be diluted 
because of the cancelling effect of increased expenditures by other 
competing or adverse corporations.63 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Dana Bash, Cash Flows in 2010 Cycle, CNN POLITICS, Oct. 27, 2010, 
http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/10/27/cash-flows-in-2010-cycle; The Money Behind the 
Elections, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/index.php. 
 62. Outside Spending, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
outsidespending/index.php. One should note, however, that outside spending increased to $157 million 
in the 2008 election, which was a presidential election, and thus not as strong of a comparison as the 
2006 midterm elections. Id. The increase between 2006 and 2008, which was before the Citizens United 
opinion when corporations were restricted with regard to independent expenditures, was 420% whereas 
the increase between the 2008 and the 2010 election was 134%. Id. To get a complete picture of the 
impact of Citizens United with regard to outside spending between both midterm election and 
presidential election cycles, further data will have to be gathered and analyzed after the 2012 and other 
future elections. The author intends to do further research in this area after the 2012 presidential 
election. 
 63. This observation is a general one and is not applicable to individual situations where a political 
expenditure is used as a threat or as a reward for certain legislative action upon the request of a 
constituent corporation. 
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2.  Inefficient Allocation of Resources and Impact on Shareholder 
Wealth 
As more corporations are rationally coerced to make political 
expenditures based upon the relaxed regulatory landscape after 
Citizens United, more firm resources will be dedicated to the creation 
and dissemination of political messages.64 Increased participation 
increases the likelihood that such messages will be canceled out or 
reduced to political noise for both the voters and the elected 
officials.65 Even with this knowledge, the threat of being 
disadvantaged (Corporation A makes an expenditure, but opponent 
Corporation B does not) should motivate the corporation to make the 
expenditure, evidencing the rational coercion that is at play. Firm 
resources that are dedicated to such political noise raise the question 
of inefficient allocation of resources.66 
Initial research demonstrates a negative correlation between 
shareholder-friendly regulations and political activity (meaning pro-
shareholder regulations decreased the political activity of firms) and 
that political activity was negatively correlated with value of the firm 
(meaning that the more political activity engaged in the less value of 
the firm).67 Extrapolating from the prisoner’s dilemma analysis and 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. 
L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999) (discussing the “hydraulic” nature of campaign donations in that “political 
money, like water, has to go somewhere”); Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party 
Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131, 134, 149 (2005) (discussing how the “hydraulics of campaign finance 
are most often just a subset category of the hydraulics of party regulation” and that “[l]imiting 
contributions leads not to a reduction in total campaign spending, but instead shifts funds from 
contributions to the unregulated opportunities of independent expenditures”). 
 65. See, e.g., Larry M. Bartels, Messages Received: The Political Impact of Media Exposure, 87 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV 267, 267–85 (1993); see also David Brooks, Don’t Follow the Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
18, 2010, at A31, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/opinion/19brooks.html. 
 66. See, e.g., N. GREGORY MANKIW, ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMICS 227 (4th ed. 2007). 
 67. John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Governance and Corporate Political Activity: What Effect Will 
Citizens United Have on Shareholder Wealth? 16 (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for L., Econ., and Bus., 
Discussion Paper No. 684), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1680861 (“[C]orporate political 
activity correlate[s] with weak corporate governance, it also correlates (negatively) with firm value. 
Firms with corporate governance provisions giving shareholders more power to engage in less political 
activity. Corporations that engage in political activity generate lower value for their shareholders relative 
to the value of the assets they control.”). Corporate political activity (CPA) can only be monitored to the 
extent that it is disclosed in terms of compliance with FEC or SEC regulations. Therefore it is difficult to 
draw an accurate empirical picture of CPA. To the extent that research shows a negative correlation 
between CPA and firm value, that correlation is likely to be even stronger than is observable because 
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this early body of research, the prediction that Citizens United will 
rationally coerce increased corporate political expenditures produces 
a secondary question: whether increased political activity will benefit 
shareholder citizens or not. 
Applying the prisoner’s dilemma rational analysis to the question 
of corporate political expenditures demonstrates that corporations are 
likely to be encouraged to make expenditures, the results of which 
will be to increase the cost of elections, decrease the effectiveness of 
political messages, and potentially contribute to the inefficient 
allocation of corporate resources in a way that harms shareholder 
value. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Citizen shareholders are implicated by the decision in Citizens 
United on two fronts: (1) as participants in our democracy, and (2) as 
shareholders of corporations who have been granted expanded First 
Amendment rights to make independent political expenditures. The 
consequences of Citizens United—a case that implicates election law, 
First Amendment rights, and corporate law questions—for citizen 
shareholders can be predicted utilizing the analysis in the classic 
prisoner’s dilemma. The rational coercion created in the prisoner’s 
dilemma to confess, even though silence produces the best result, is 
similar to the rational coercion exerted on corporations after Citizens 
United to make political expenditures. The coercion creates a 
perverse incentive for each corporation to make expenditures because 
it is the rational choice even though it may not produce the best 
outcome for the corporation or the group. As more corporations are 
“coerced” into making expenditures it produces a series of other 
consequences, such as increased cost of influence, increased political 
noise where messages cancel each other out, and increased cost of the 
elections in general. Additionally, Citizens United is likely to 
generate an increase in the amount of corporate resources dedicated 
                                                                                                                 
“managers will be more likely to engage in non-shareholder-wealth related CPA that is not observable, 
and more likely to engage in CPA that will create wealth for shareholders if it is observable.” Id. at 7. 
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to political expenditures, which raises the question of firm value for 
citizen shareholders. If corporations are coerced into dedicating 
resources to political expenditures, which may have diminished value 
due to the cancelling and diluting effect of other messages, citizen 
shareholders must question whether that is an efficient allocation of 
resources. These issues of coercion and efficient allocation of 
resources reframe the impact of Citizens United not in a First 
Amendment context, but in a corporate law context and perhaps 
provide a lens through which to evaluate the merit and legacy of 
Citizens United that is removed from the political and ideological 
debate which has dominated much of the public discourse on this 
case. 
After Citizens United the focus of corporate campaign finance 
regulation shifted from government legislation to the private sector, 
placing the burden on the corporations and the shareholders—most 
likely the institutional shareholders (e.g., TIAA-CREF and state 
pension funds) that have the resources to monitor corporate political 
contributions and the sway to influence corporate policies. The future 
focus of corporate campaign finance regulation, thus, must come 
from the corporations and the shareholders themselves. For 
corporations this means creating or strengthening corporate political 
spending policies and voluntary disclosures. For shareholders this 
means increased monitoring, reporting, and analyzing corporate 
political expenditures in order to educate shareholders and to draft 
successful shareholder resolutions68 that limit corporate spending 
policies and encourage internal corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 68. For example, NorthStar Asset Management Funded Pension Plan proposed a shareholder 
resolution to Home Depot, to be voted upon at 2011 annual shareholders’ meeting, recommending that 
the Board of Directors submit for shareholder approval a proposed political expenditures list for the 
following year. See The Home Depot Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, (Mar. 25, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2011/northstarasset032511-14a8.pdf.  
28
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 8
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol27/iss4/8
